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Diversity of Communities and Economic Development:
An Overview
Gustav Ranis

Abstract
This paper reviews the literature on the impact of ethnic diversity on economic
development. Ethnically polarized societies are less likely to agree on the provision of
public goods and more likely to engage in rent seeking activities providing lower levels
of social capital. Initial conditions are important determinants of adverse development
outcomes. The role of decentralization, democracy and markets as potential remedies are
discussed. The paper then presents a number of preliminary hypotheses on the
relationship between diversity and instability in order to stimulate future research.
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I. Introduction
There seems to be a general consensus, based on both cross-country regressions
and individual country studies, that ethnic diversity, especially in the Sub-Saharan
African context, is one of the causal factors behind relatively poor development
performance. While most of the relevant literature focuses on diversity’s impact on
economic growth, there also is evidence that it adversely affects income distribution,
poverty as well as human development.
It is generally accepted that more than two thousand ethnic groups, generally
lacking exit, find themselves in Sub-Saharan Africa, a fact which can be taken as
exogenous, although some have expressed the view that landlocked conditions may have
contributed to such marked ethnic diversity. There is also agreement that it would be a
mistake to talk about “the” African economy without distinguishing at least between
natural resource rich cases, coastal cash crop exporters, and land-locked, internally
oriented, economies. But much less is known about the impact of such diversity on
economic stability or instability in Africa, which is the main focus of this project.
We intend to proceed as follows: In section II we summarize some of what seems
to be known in the literature with respect to the impact of diversity, however defined, on
development. In section III we present some preliminary hypotheses about diversity and
economic volatility. Finally, in section IV, we will briefly summarize and indicate what
the research priorities seem to be, based on our admittedly imperfect overview of the
literature.
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II.

Diversity and Development
Following Barro’s lead, 1 some people have detected no unique African

explanation for Africa’s poor performance but blame it all on poor policies, the usual
violations of the Washington Consensus, including the lack of openness, low savings
rates, flawed monetary and fiscal policies, as well as lack of access to the sea, a tropical
climate, Dutch disease, corruption and sometimes even the kitchen sink. Sachs and
Warner, 2 for example, follow this line of thinking. On the other hand, Paul Collier, 3 as
well as Collier and Gunning 4 and Easterly and Levine 5 point to the importance of ethnic
diversity. Collier and Gunning, for example, claim that ethno-linguistic fractionalization
(ELF), accounts for 35% of the growth shortfall, or 45% if closely linked poor policies
are included 6 . José Garcia-Montalvo and Marta Reynal-Querol 7 prefer polarization as
the measure of diversity of greatest relevance in most cases but share the general view of
the importance of diversity’s impact on growth. 8
The main argument being put forward by such authors as Easterly and Levine is
that polarized societies can’t agree on needed public goods and are more likely to engage
in rent-seeking activities. Collier 9 similarly points to ELF as reducing trust, increasing
transactions costs and adversely affecting development generally. Bates 10 does not
embrace the ELF measure in the same way but agrees to emphasize that contacts and
1

Barro, Robert J., 1991.
Sachs, Jeffrey D & Warner, Andrew M, 1997.
3
Collier, Paul, 2007.
4
Collier, Paul, & Gunning, Jan-Willem, 1999.
5
Easterly, William & Levine, Ross, 1997.
6
ELF is measured by the probability that two randomly chosen individuals in a given country don’t belong
to the same ethnolinguistic group.
7
Montalvo, Jose G. & Reynal-Querol, Marta, 2005.
8
Polarization is measured by the degree of homogeneity within groups, the degree of heterogeneity across
groups, plus, most importantly, a small number of similarly sized groups.
9
Collier, Paul, 1998.
10
Bates, Robert H., 2000.
2
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contracts, implicit or explicit, within groups, can be quite strong and promote both human
capital and human development within but not across groups.
Most specialists on the subject seem to hold the view that Africa’s generally low
population density makes it difficult to generate the kind of trust which crosses ethnic
boundaries that is required for the provision of public goods. Individuals as well as entire
clans tend to look at each other and worry about patent inequalities, vertical as well as
horizontal, rather than about their absolute levels of welfare. It is in this sense that, in
ethnically divided societies, each group has its own egalitarian impulse, but that impulse
does not extend across ethnic lines, either by virtue of insurance or altruism. This is in
sharp contrast to the case of some of the more densely populated countries of Asia, where
land scarcity and labor abundance have led to cooperation across ethnicities, especially in
the case of intensive agriculture.
It also true that strong, within-group loyalty hurts growth in another way, i.e. it
does not pay for the individual member of a clan to stand out or do well or get promoted
if this results in the rest of his extended family descending on him. Alesina et al. 11 favor
the ELF, while Reynal-Querol, 12 as well as Esteban and Ray, 13 prefer the concept of
polarization, a closely balanced, therefore, contested, ethnic majority dominance.
There are findings in the literature that low levels of ELF as well as very high
levels do not pose as much of a threat to development as intermediate levels. Others
conclude that we should really be counting much more on polarization when two
contending parties are very close in terms of their power, which may lead to bad policy

11

Alesina, Alberto, Devleeschauwer, Arnaud, Easterly, William, Kurlat, Sergio & Wacziarg , Romain,
2003.
12
Reynal-Querol, Marta, 2002.
13
Esteban, Joan & Ray, Debraj, 1994.
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and bad development outcomes but also to less stability. The correlation between
fragmentation and polarization is apparently positive and very high at low levels of ELF
but zero or even negative at intermediate and high levels. But we will not spill much ink
here on the question of how diversity is best measured; it clearly depends on the
empirical reality and the question being asked.
While many authors have discussed the underlying causes of adverse
development outcomes, lots of issues are still open for discussion, and some of these are
by no means irrelevant to the basic question to be addressed in this project. Issues still
open for debate include the importance of initial conditions, including colonial heritage,
natural resource endowment, the role of institutions, broadly defined, as well as the
relevance of the extent of democracy (or lack thereof) in affecting the relationship
between diversity and growth.
With respect to the initial conditions, the relative abundance of land and the low
level of population density have already been referred to. While we are ready to accept
kinship relationships as exogenously given, there can be little doubt that they are a
substitute for social security networks and that any inequality of the initial distribution of
land and other assets historically permitted clan elites to capture politics. Unlike the case
of the more homogeneous Asian superfamilies, we have here smaller kinship-loyal
families, sustaining cooperation within the group, but without altruism travelling across
ethnicities. Consequently, increased diversity leads to less collective action with respect
to public goods and, at the aggregate level, to more engagement in free-riding, and
consequent lower growth and other adverse developmental outcomes. As Avner Greif14
has also emphasized, citing European historical evidence, legal and political institutions
14

Greif, Avner, 1993.
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foster intra-elite cooperation but inter-group non-cooperation. The same asymmetry
exists with respect to social capital, relatively strong within ethnic groups but not
extending across ethnic groups. Within groups, there is bonding going on, which is
relatively weak across groups. Bridging across groups is, of course, difficult, even if
better for optimization in the economic sense. The larger the extent of diversity the more
bonding, and the less bridging.
The strength of natural resource endowments represents an important dimension
of the initial conditions. Natural resources are an important cause of the likely
asymmetry between different ethnic groups, depending on the vagaries of nature and
culminating in the reduced incentive of those blessed with relative abundance to provide
public goods to others. Moreover, the resource-dominant groups are likely to suffer from
some manifestation of the so-called natural resource curse, encouraging rent-seeking and
weakening the pressure for economic or institutional reforms, all of which, of course,
contributes to sustained unequal distributions of income, both of the vertical and
horizontal type. In this setting, local public goods are always preferred over national
public goods and the same sort of asymmetries affect the overall quality of social capital
which is based on intensive trust within rather than across groups. As Jonathan Temple 15
points out, an initial unequal distribution of income generally affects development
negatively. Similarly, Knack and Keefer 16 support the position that trust is more
pronounced, ceteris paribus, when incomes are more equally distributed.
Clearly, the spillover of social capital across ethnic boundaries, as well as the
willingness to provide national public goods, depends very much on the overall

15
16

Temple, Jonathan, 1998.
Knack, Stephen & Keefer, Philip, 1997.
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distribution of income, both of the vertical and horizontal types, which are, to some
extent, overlapping. As Fosu, Bates and Hoeffler 17 point out, heterogeneous societies are
better at private goods provision, working through the market, but not very good at
providing public goods. Greif emphasizes that land or mineral rights are usually critical
and are not at all helped by dysfunctional institutions which obstruct egalitarian
outcomes. Kinship groups can be useful in the private sector, as ethnic minorities
benefit. But in the public sector they can be harmful, as ethnic majorities benefit. What
is not clear and worthy of investigation is whether diversity improves the quality of
private goods via an increase in variety.
All of this argues for the possible importance of decentralization. There exists, of
course, a good deal of literature concerning vertical decentralization, both pro and con,
with the pros emphasizing that local communities have more information and are likely
to exhibit much less diversity than the center and the cons pointing to the greater
likelihood that local elites will dominate. Vertical decentralization is seen as reducing
friction but may also, as some authors point out, lead to the creation of regional parties
with less interest in public goods at the national level. In other words, if too many groups
form at the local level, no one is strong enough to control the state and no one is in a
position to mobilize an “encompassing interest,” a la Mancur Olson, at the national level.
Diversity builds trust within groups and, while vertical decentralization is helpful at the
local level, it reduces trust at the national level, as well as the provision of public goods,
with results already referred to.

17

Fosu, Augustin & Bates, Robert & Hoeffler, Anke, 2006.
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Others, including Bardhan 18 worry about the enhanced possibilities for corruption
at the local level, often dominated by local elites. But the comparison between corruption
at central and local levels is an unresolved issue and can only be settled by empirical,
individual country analysis. In any case, with vertical decentralization leading to smaller
jurisdictions exhibiting less diversity, ELF is reduced but there is a greater danger of
polarization, i.e., a large minority opposing the central government, as pointed out by
Yuichi Sasaoka. 19 The fact is that most central governments are in the hands of a small
elite using public goods to exercise patronage of one kind or another, mostly in the form
of civil service employment.
Much less attention is paid in the literature to another kind of decentralization, i.e.
the horizontal type, shifting power from the executive, especially the finance ministry, to
the legislative branches at all levels, as well as to the judiciary, thus providing greater
access for minorities which can make a large difference.20 Trust can be strongly
influenced by such an independent judiciary, a feature rarely in evidence.
As far as I can surmise, the jury is still out with respect to the impact of
democracy on all this. Alesina et al. 21 think diversity is less serious in democracies since
minorities are more likely to feel represented. Barro 22 finds that democracy enhances
growth at low levels of income and depresses it at intermediate levels. Most of the
parliamentary systems turn out to be more stable than presidential ones, especially when
there are many clans represented by various political parties. With ethnic diversity more

18

Bardhan, Pranab K. & Mookherjee, Dilip, 2000.
Sasaoka, Yuichi, 2007.
20
Brancati, Dawn, 2006.
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pronounced at the center, a diverse society benefits more from democracy and a more
competitive political system lowers rent-seeking and increases efficiency. Bates, Greif,
Humphreys and Singh 23 find that authoritarian governments lower TFP and thus growth
and other dimensions of development. On the other hand, Besley and Kudamatsu 24 point
out that autocratic regimes may be extremely good or bad, possibly performing better
than democracies if the electorate is sufficiently well organized. If central government
elites are sedentary bandits this may lead to resistance, possibly violence and lower
growth, something that Bates, Greif et al call “a political trap.” But if the bandits are of
the roving type this is more likely to generate instability as public goods become
exceedingly scarce and are fought over. To conclude that democracy has little impact on
growth but could have an impact on stability is a subject to which we shall return.
Since the role of markets is an important issue for our project, in the private sector
minority kinship groups benefit from its relative impersonality while, in the public sector,
minority kinship groups are disadvantaged and majorities benefit. Therefore, the ruling
elite usually prefers the public sector, even if it is less efficient. With respect to
production sectors, in agriculture the majority of kinship groups usually eschew social
capital beyond their own jurisdiction. In industry, where minority groups are likely to
gravitate, they benefit from the relatively larger, more urban, private activity. Hence, for
any given distribution of political and economic resources one might expect a more
market oriented system to be superior in terms of developmental outcomes. However,
markets may also accentuate or even create horizontal inequalities, especially given an
initial unequal distribution of natural resources. Moreover, a strong market orientation is

23
24

Bates, Robert H., Greif, Avner, Humphreys, Macartan & Singh, Smita, 2004.
Besley, Timothy J. & Kudamatsu, Masayuki, 2007.
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often associated with a lower level of public goods and thus gives minorities less of an
obligation to respect the state in terms of taxes or any other indication of support.

III. Diversity and Volatility
In this section, given the fact that very little research to date has focused on the
relationship between diversity and instability, we intend to present a number of
preliminary hypotheses which may, possibly, help stimulate future research in the context
of this project. It is probably useful to differentiate here again among three types, the
natural resource rich countries, those which have access to the oceans and depend on
primary product exports and those which are landlocked and probably rank among the
poorest.
There can be little doubt that the unequal distribution of natural resource wealth
across different clans can be a cause of instability, as those who are not favored by nature
are likely to object and provoke political instability, leading to economic instability.
There is clearly a tendency for those blessed by nature to deny public goods to the rest of
the body politic across ethnic borders, if only to yield sporadically, when under pressure.
This may be one reason why it has been found in several empirical studies that the
intermediate level of diversity, as measured by the ELF, leads to the worst case of
political instability and, therefore, economic instability.
Turning to primary producing countries with access to trade, terms of trade
fluctuations can be expected to be a major source of instability, especially affecting the
commercially advantaged clans relative to those who are less advantaged. There is ample
evidence that terms of trade fluctuations have very much affected growth in Sub-Saharan
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Africa and it would not require a lot of additional research to show that, within particular
countries, the more diverse the society, the more likely that terms of trade fluctuations
will lead to fluctuations in development, including growth, poverty and income
distribution outcomes. There is evidence that exposure to terms of trade volatility is 50%
higher in Sub-Saharan Africa than in other developing countries, after controlling for
differences in incomes per capita. Food insecurity, also unequally affecting different
clans, can similarly enhance economic volatility.
In addition, terms of trade fluctuations are usually badly managed by
governments. During downturns a government typically tries to supplement demand via
government budget deficits and monetary expansion, while, during upturns, it becomes
very bullish and tries to enhance growth by means of foreign borrowing and, once again,
domestic expansionary fiscal and monetary policies. Such asymmetry over the cycle
ultimately leads to crisis, to the imposition of import restrictions, of devaluations, and
other sudden changes in overall policy, in a system under duress, all of which has the
effect of generating instability. Easterly, Kremer, Pritchett and Summers 25 indicate that
terms of trade shocks explain much of the growth fluctuations in Africa. Country
characteristics, of course, matter, but policies matter less than the extent of externally
caused volatility, affecting different groups differentially. Internal policies may add to
the problem. For example, export marketing boards, which are still prevalent in some
countries, have erratic price-setting policies, often favoring the commercialized regions
of a country and contributing to overall volatility. To reduce such boom and bust
oscillations one needs a democracy with relatively strong checks and balances, as, for
example, in the Botswana diamonds case.
25

Easterly, William, Kremer, Michael, Pritchett, Lant & Summers, Lawrence H., 1993.
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With respect to all three types of African countries, including the land-locked, it
can be assumed that frequent political turnover and regime change, which has been an
endemic feature of much of Sub-Saharan Africa, leads not only to political but also
economic instability. It should not be difficult to trace the number of coups, changes in
governments, even in ministers of finance, as causal agents in this respect. Oscillation
between a market orientation and a controls orientation in policy, which is often referred
to as sub-optimal for development generally, can also be considered a likely cause of
instability, especially if these decisions are the result of continuous bargaining between
different ethnic groups and the central government. Power-sharing as a solution, via
proportional representation, mutual veto and decentralization 26 has not been much in
evidence in Africa. If decentralization takes the form of delegation or deconcentration,
not devolution to local bodies in the form of fiscal decentralization, reliance on the
center’s funds for public goods is retained. This maintains power in the hands of those
who control lives and is likely to lead to lobbying, continuous bargaining, uncertainty,
conflict and economic fluctuations. As Kimenyi 27 points out, ethnic heterogeneity leads
to the under-provision of non-excludable public goods but favors excludable patronage
goods. Resistance to this system by minorities risks higher instability, especially if
combined with the central government’s inequitable tax and other direct interventions in
favor of the elite, permitting trust to fluctuate and decline over time. Of course, if clan
population proportions change, especially in closely split polarized societies, another
reason for volatility makes its appearance. The possibility of alternating roving and

26
27

Lijphart, Arend, 1977.
Kimenyi, Mwangi S., 2006.
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stationary bandit regimes is not at all unrealistic and also relevant to the issue of
instability.
Another source of instability results from the gradual shift in much of SubSaharan Africa from traditional communal land ownership, with virtually unlimited
supplies of land, to private ownership and modern property rights, as land shortage,
combined with population increase, leads to titling, insecurity and volatility.
Other agents of globalization may well contribute to economic instability. For
example, it is no secret that foreign aid agencies often play favorites, supporting natural
resource-rich regions or politically attractive clans from their own foreign policy points
of view, thus exacerbating both horizontal and vertical inequalities and causing political
as well as economic instability. NGOs, which are increasingly numerous in quantity and
influential in terms of resources, but weak in terms of cohesion and accountability, are
often found competing with each other and jockeying for favor among various ethnic
groups, thus making a contribution to an increase in volatility.

IV. Concluding Thoughts
In conclusion, it should be amply clear that we know a good deal about the impact
of diversity on development, mostly on growth, but that we have relatively little evidence
to date on the impact of diversity on instability. Therefore this particular project seems to
have ample room for making a substantial contribution.
What I’ve tried to do in section II is to cite as many of the known facts and
conclusions that have come to my attention from research in the past on the subject of the
impact of diversity on growth and to present best guesses, not yet based on the literature,
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of what causal links between diversity and instability might be worthy of future
examination, in Section III. Country studies, pitting Ghana versus Kenya and Nigeria
versus Botswana would certainly be indicated.
It is suggested that careful attention be given to decentralization which may be
stabilizing if it is accompanied by fiscal devolution, but not if the center retains the bulk
of resources and is able to favor culturally aligned groups and those already favored by
nature at the local level. Thus, the best sequence seems to be economic reforms followed
by both political and fiscal decentralization. The role of foreign capital, especially
foreign aid and NGO flows, possibly, but not necessarily, contributing to instability,
needs to be examined.
The basic normative issue before us is how enhanced and non volatile trust can be
generated in the presence of diversity and how the related issue of sustainably
encouraging the provision of national public goods can best be tackled. As Jean-Philippe
Platteau, 28 aptly put it “how generalized trust… can be established … is probably one of
the most challenging questions confronting development scholars.”

28

Platteau, Jean-Phiilippe, 1994.
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